NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

A CIVIL-MILITARY CRISIS?
TOCQUEVILLE'S THEORY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

BY
MARTIN NEUBAUER, LT COL, USAF

COURSE 5603
THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY PROCESS
PROFESSOR FLECK

14 DECEMBER 1998

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED
14 DEC 1998		**14-12-1998 to 14-12-1998**

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
A Civil-Military Crisis? Tocqueville's of Civil-Military Relations	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) **National War College,300 5th Avenue,Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319-6000**	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
see report

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			
unclassified	**unclassified**	**unclassified**		**28**	

The steady operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the same kind. Considerations of economy, not less than of stability and vigor, confirm this position. The American militia, in the course of the late war, have, by their valor on numerous occasions, erected eternal monuments to their fame; but the bravest of them feel and know that the liberty of their country could not have been established by their efforts alone, however great and valuable they were. War, like most other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by time, and by practice.

Federalist 25

Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community *require time* to mature them for execution. An army, so large as seriously to menace those liberties, could only be formed by progressive augmentations; which would suppose, not merely a temporary combination between the legislature and executive, but a continued conspiracy for a series of time. Is it probable that such a combination would exist at all? Is it probable that it would be persevered in, and transmitted along through all the successive variations in a representative body, which biennial elections would naturally produce in both houses? Is it presumable, that every man, the instant he took his seat in the national Senate or House of Representatives, would commence a traitor to his constituents and to his country?

Federalist 26

If standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the militia, in the body to whose care the protection of the State is committed, ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement and the pretext to such unfriendly institutions. If the federal government can command the aid of the militia in those emergencies which call for the military arm in support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of the former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an army unnecessary, will be a more certain method of preventing its existence than a thousand prohibitions on paper.

Federalist 29

I. Introduction and Overview

Recent years have seen a flood of scholarly and popular debate over the declining state of civil-military relations in the United States. Much of this debate suggests deterioration of those relations is in some way related to contemporary geopolitical developments, particularly the end of the Cold War; consequently, most proposals to address this relationship adopt a contemporary perspective. This paper, in contrast, argues that tension between civil society and the armed forces of democratic states is a naturally-occurring phenomenon, with roots in the nature of democracy itself. It draws on the insights of one of our keenest observers, Alexis de Tocqueville, who suggested that democracy affects every aspect of society in *some* way, and that some of the effects of democracy would be inherently antithetical to democracy itself.

This paper reviews the current debate on civil-military relations, outlining the major lines of argument. It then examines objective research data to evaluate the actual existence of a growing gap between military and society in the United States. It subsequently evaluates this evidence in light of Tocqueville's theoretical framework, set out in broader form in the author's overview of Tocqueville's comprehensive body of thought on military forces in democratic states (see Appendix). It concludes with some possible approaches that take into account the root causes of civil-military tension, in an attempt to escape the essentially ahistorical trap of viewing this problem (or any problem) as being unique to our times, and thus limiting the options available to address the issue.

Why this topic? What is its connection to the national security policy process? Quite simply, policy is formulated and implemented in a context. This context consists of several important dimensions, among them the economic, domestic political, and international spheres. Policy makers—presumed to be rational beings—attempt to anticipate environmental constraints. Consequently, their perceptions of the policy environment will affect policy formulation. In other words, the policy environment is operative *well before* implementation; understanding these environmental constraints may help explain policy choices.

In this paper, I consider one aspect of the domestic political and social environment on both national security policy formulation and implementation. One of the most provocative descriptions of this environment is outlined in Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, which deals with a broad range of issues ranging from politics to sociology to economics. This paper argues that Tocqueville's analysis raises serious issues with profound implications for the ability of democratic states to formulate and implement policy relevant to the civil-military relationship. Understanding the characteristics of this environmental constraint may help avoid pitfalls that could have grave consequences for society.

II. The Contemporary Debate

Much of the current debate on civil-military relations assumes a marked deterioration of this relationship over the past decade, although some observers

point to the end of the Vietnam war as the crucial turning point. There are several broad schools of thought on the issue:

- There's a serious problem, and its origins are fairly recent.

- There's a serious problem, with origins somewhere in the remote past.

- There *might* be a problem, but the verdict isn't in.

- Problem? What problem?

Discussion is complicated somewhat by inconsistent use of terminology. Those who argue most forcefully for the existence of a crisis rarely define precisely what constitutes a crisis, thus making reasonable discussion a challenge at best. There is also considerable divergence among writers on just what constitutes the 'civil-military relationship.' In a broad sense, this relationship comprises "interactions between the military institution on the one hand, and government decision makers, public opinion leaders and society, on the other.. "[1] While concise and accurate, this definition is difficult to operationalize. What *most* observers mean is civilian control of the military, a far more specific subset that is still difficult to define and challenging to measure directly. Moreover, indirect measurements necessarily rely on sets of assumptions that are not generally accepted by a majority of the discussants, a divide that has roots in the differing research methodologies of the wide range of disciplines engaged in the discussion (political science, sociology, history, etc.).

---

[1] Marina Caparini, "The Challenge of Establishing Democratic Civilian Control Over the Armed Forces of Central and Eastern Europe," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Winter 1997 16.

Within the four basic approaches noted above are a number of attempts at explanation, most focusing on the first two (crisis with recent roots, crisis with old roots). The most prominent attempts at explanation include:

- crisis driven by change within the military[2]

-- the end of conscription and the rise of the all-volunteer force

-- adoption of technology that erases the distinction between many military jobs and civilian jobs

-- service-driven reforms aimed at curing the 'Vietnam hangover'

-- increasing politicization of the military[3]

- crisis driven by change in the greater society

-- society asking the military to perform tasks other than national defense[4]

-- an executive branch leadership with little direct experience of military service or military matters in general

-- increasing privatization of many jobs formerly performed by uniformed personnel, as budget constraints reduce defense spending

-- multiculturalism, with its emphasis on tolerance and individualism rather than the institutional group-centered focus of the armed forces

- crisis driven by change in the international order

-- the end of the Cold War eliminates a clearly identifiable threat to the state

---

[2] Thomas E. Ricks, *On American Soil: The Widening Gap Between the U S. Military and U.S. Society*, Harvard University· The John M Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996 3

[3] Ibid , 3.

[4] Richard H. Kohn, *The Forgotten Fundamentals of Civilian Control of the Military in Democratic Government*, Harvard University John M Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997 11

-- proliferation of non-traditional military threats (drug cartels, terrorists, non-state actors)

-- increasing emphasis on internal versus external missions that erodes combat capability[5]

III. Data and Trends

Recent research has attempted to answer some of the questions surrounding civil-military relationships using survey data. Most useful are the statistics compiled by Ole Holsti under the auspices of the *Project on U.S. Post Cold-War Civil-Military Relations*. His findings rely on survey data compiled over a 20-year period at 4-year intervals. The research instruments are designed to address only one aspect of civil-military relations: politicization of the military and its divergence from the values of civilian society.[6]

Survey data indicate strong evidence of increasing partisanship among military elites, and more revealing, suggest the gap between party identification among military and civilian policy elites is widening, with military members self-identifying overwhelmingly as Republican. On another set of questions, there is solid evidence to indicate divergence of attitudes toward international issues, with military elites far less accommodating than hard-line in approach.[7] The greatest differences over the two decades in question have been in the realm of

---

[5] Michael C. Desch, "Soldiers, states, and structures: The end of the Cold War and weakening U S civilian control," *Armed Forces and Society* (Spring 1998) 391

[6] Ole R. Holsti, *A Widening Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-1996,* Harvard University. John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997 2

social and values-related issues. Here, military elites are far more conservative than their civilian counterparts. Across the board, there is substantial evidence to indicate deep-seated differences between the senior members of the armed forces and national policy elites, although evidence of a growing gap across the board is inconclusive.

Despite the evidence of consistent differences in attitudes, however, there is little evidence of widespread alienation of the military leadership from society.[8] Many of the findings support what others have observed using anecdotal evidence, namely that the military is different from society. This is hardly surprising. What it means, if anything, is very difficult to judge. The existence of tensions between civilian and military elites may in fact be a normal and healthy state of affairs. Its implications for civilian control are in any event unclear, and there is much research to be done.

The problem with research that focuses exclusively on elites is that it may indeed capture one important aspect of the issue, but miss other issues that may be equally important. First, elite research misses the very important mid-career and junior military grades. Tocqueville's theory suggests there are important differences within the armed forces themselves, and these comprise an essential part of the tension between the armed forces and society. Second, elite research misses the connection between the military and the broader society, whose members may or may not share attitudes toward the military with the

---

[7] Ibid., 5.
[8] Ibid , 9.

elites.[9] Anecdotal evidence suggests the broader society may have more in common with the military than either has in common with elites. If true, this has considerable significance for our discussion. And finally, even if it can be established that military elites no longer resemble the society from which they came, there is no direct evidence to suggest that this is of itself destructive of civilian control. The issue is provocative but inconclusive.

IV. Tocqueville's Contribution

To the four principal positions outlined above in Section II, Tocqueville offers an alternative. He argues that the nature of democracy itself creates an inherent instability with regard to civil-military relations. Military forces tend to separate themselves from society and resist civilian control as they grow increasingly distinctive. Remedies will tend to reassert the primacy of civilian control, but will impair military effectiveness. The tension is natural, explicable, and controllable so long as it is properly understood as arising from the form of government, rather than representing an anomaly with roots elsewhere.

How well does Tocqueville's theory hold up in the contemporary debate? Surprisingly well, and in some areas better than the competition. Tocqueville offers useful insights that could be profitably brought back to the table. Paragraph references below are to the Appendix, a summary of Tocqueville's comprehensive theory of civil-military issues.

---

[9] Ibid , 10.

First, it is not particularly helpful to view the military as a monolithic entity. According to the theory, there are vast differences between society and three distinct portions of the military (para. 2.2), which tend to be connected to society in significantly different ways. Any discussion that fails to deal with these differences will miss the mark.

Second, the promotion system is extremely important in democratic armed forces (para. 1.2). So long as the best opportunities for promotion arise from combat, there will be pressures in the mid-grades to use force where it might not serve the greater good of the state. Interestingly, longevity-based promotion systems tend to encourage increasingly pacifistic views within the senior officer corps, which may be reluctant to go to arms when it may be in the state's best interest (para. 2.4).[10]

Third, there is a natural tendency in peacetime for the most talented members of society to avoid military service, which tends to accelerate separation of the armed forces from the greater society (para. 1.3).

Fourth, professionalism carries significant risks (para. 2.2), as it tends to promote the emergence of unique attitudes that are at odds with democratic society as a whole.

Fifth, the threat environment plays a vital role, perhaps the most important of all (para. 1.3). Democracies can be rallied to defend their state, but in the absence of a clearly articulated *external* threat, there is a natural tendency for

---

[10] A review of President Lincoln's relations with his general officers in the early years of the Civil War lends support to this finding.

talent to gravitate toward other fields. Militaries that fail to address such a threat risk marginalization.

V. Some Modest Proposals

If we accept the thesis that there is indeed a crisis in the American civil-military relationship, we must either identify possible solutions, or explain why the problem cannot be solved. The problem with most current approaches is that they fail to explicitly address the nature of democracy itself as a root cause of the tension. Attempts to tackle the issue without doing this risk treating symptoms rather than root causes. Given this, what might be some possible ways to tackle the issue? The list below is intended to be suggestive rather than definitive, and is in the form of rough guidelines. Nonetheless, despite the political unpalatability of some of the suggestions, it may be time to reintroduce them to the debate.

First, increase the flow of citizens through the armed forces. This is important for its effects on both the military and society as a whole. Tocqueville identifies those portions of the military with the least attachment to the institution as being the most democratic. Individuals and society benefit from exposure to military values, and the military is bound to society by exposure to its values.

Second, reduce barriers to returning to the civilian world from active duty. All too often, junior military personnel are pressured to remain on active duty, a

reflection of the considerable investment in their training and acculturation. One of the explicit goals of all the military services should be to produce the largest alumni association, which cannot happen through retirement alone. There are clearly costs associated with recruitment and training, but this is one area where recognition of the issue by all parties (particularly the legislative branch) could address funding at a level that would increase flow through the armed services.

Third, take a hard look at the military education systems (academies, graduate education, etc.). Any portion of the accession and professionalization process that encourages loyalty to the institution rather than to the state must undergo very hard scrutiny. While there are deep-seated loyalties to the service academies, to take but one instance, it must be acknowledged that they encourage early separation of at least part of the officer corps from society and encourage an extended separation via lengthy service commitments after graduation. Commissioning programs in civilian institutions are important mechanisms for building close civil-military ties; their importance should not be underestimated.

Fourth, take a hard look at promotion systems. Tocqueville suggests the military promotion system, based on seniority during peacetime and on valor during war, works at cross-purposes to democratic society. This is not to suggest that the military can or should be inherently democratic in its internal operating procedures, but the debate over civil-military relations should

encourage close scrutiny of mechanisms that tend to promote institutional loyalties at the expense of strict civilian control.

Fifth, re-open debate on the proper balance between the regular and reserve forces and the National Guard. The writers of the *Federalist Papers* and Tocqueville agree that the militia is an important element to retention of a balance between the state and its subordinate elements. This will clearly have an impact on combat effectiveness, but society as a whole must examine what it values most, and be prepared to make difficult tradeoffs.

Last, use the uniformed military in mission areas that are related to national defense, defined in its strictest sense as defense from external military threats. Tocqueville's theory suggests public support of the military will quickly evaporate during those periods when it is not seen to be protecting the state from external threats. There is an understandable tendency to use the first available tool to do the job at hand; while this may in fact produce short-term savings, it can have far higher long-term costs that society may not be willing to pay if it understands those costs. In any event, it should not fall to the armed forces to make this argument. It is a curious logic that demands use of military forces for explicitly non-military purposes, but then criticizes the military for exceeding its proper bounds.

The tension between democracies and their armed forces goes to the roots of democracy, witness the conflicting views among the writers of the *Federalist Papers* on the first page of this paper. The existence of a troubled relationship

that is a normal phenomenon of democratic society hardly constitutes a crisis. It should concern us, but to label it as a crisis is to miss the permanent nature of the relationship. Worse, a diagnosis of crisis may be conveniently used to justify remedies that go far beyond what is necessary to control the relationship, turning a serious issue into a vehicle for other issues that have little to do with the original question. This risks trivializing an ongoing debate that has profound consequences for society as a whole.

Use of Tocqueville's framework should help focus the search for solutions on the long term; it requires great patience. This approach should help temper unreasonable expectations, as any changes are likely to be at the margin. Viewing the issue as structurally inherent in democracy may help fend off the 'do something drastic now' school, and will inform the debate both within and outside the armed forces.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A Growing Civil-Military Gap? Wrap-Up Panel Discussion of the Olin Institute's U.S. Military and Post-Cold War American Security Project. Harvard University: John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997 Working Paper No. 14.

Avant, Deborah. "Conflicting indicators of "crisis" in American civil-military relations." *Armed Forces and Society* (Spring 1998): 375-387.

Bacevich, Andrew J. "Absent history: A comment on Dauber, Desch, and Feaver." *Armed Forces and Society* (Spring 1998): 447-453.

_____. "Tradition abandoned: America's military in a new era." *The National Interest* (Summer 1997): 16-25.

Burk, James. "The logic of crisis and civil-military relations theory: A comment on Desch, Feaver, and Dauber." *Armed Forces and Society* (Spring 1998): 455-462.

Caparini, Marina. "The Challenge of Establishing Democratic Civilian Control Over the Armed Forces of Central and Eastern Europe." *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (Winter 1997): 16-24.

Dauber, Cori. "The practice of argument: Reading the condition of civil-military relations." *Armed Forces and Society* (Spring 1998): 435-446.

Desch, Michael C. "Soldiers, states, and structures: The end of the Cold War and weakening U.S. civilian control." *Armed Forces and Society* (Spring 1998): 389-405.

_____. "A historian's fallacies: A reply to Bacevich." *Armed Forces and Society* (Summer 1998): 5898-594.

Feaver, Peter D. "The civil-military problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the question of civilian control." *Armed Forces and Society* (Winter 1996): 149-178.

_____. "Crisis as shirking: An agency theory explanation of the souring of American civil-military relations." *Armed Forces and Society* (Spring 1998): 407-434.

_____. "Modeling civil-military relations: A reply to Burk and Bacevich." *Armed Forces and Society* (Summer 1998): 595-602.

Foster, Gregory D. "Combating the crisis in civil-military relations." *The Humanist* (Jan/Feb 1998): 6-11.

Gold, Philip. "The American Citizen as soldier: A solution whose time has come?" *Insight on the News*, 3 Aug 97: 30-31.

Holsti, Ole R. *A Widening Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-1996*. Harvard University: John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957.

_____. "Democracy and the armed forces: Reforming civil-military relations." *Current* (February 1996): 17-22.

Kohn, Richard H. *The Forgotten Fundamentals of Civilian Control of the Military in Democratic Government*. Harvard University: John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997.

Korb, Lawrence J. *The Military and Social Change*. Harvard University: John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996.

Ricks, Thomas E. *On American Soil: The Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and U.S. Society*. Harvard University: John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996.

Sarkesian, Sam C. "When should the military speak up? A civil-military dilemma." *Current* (October 1998): 11-17.

_____. "U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition?" *The American Political Science Review* (September 1996): 706-707.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. *Democracy in America, Vol. I*. Translated by Henry Reeve. New York: Vintage Classics, 1990.

_____. *Democracy in America, Vol. II*. Translated by Henry Reeve. New York: Vintage Classics, 1990.

APPENDIX: Tocqueville's Theory of Democracy and the Military

Note: This appendix comprises a portion of the author's codification of Tocqueville's writing on military issues, submitted in fulfillment of National War College course requirements for Course 5602: "Tocqueville on War and Democracy."

1. Relations between the state and its armed forces

1.1. As social conditions become more equal, the passion to conduct war will become more rare.[1] This occurs as a result of:

1.1.1. Reduction of property distribution inequalities, a characteristic of democratic societies;[2]

1.1.2. Decreasing public spiritedness, caused by dissolution of the social bonds that characterize autocratic and strongly hierarchical societies;[3]

1.1.2. The inherent conservatism of societies in which there are no gross inequalities of opportunity.[4]

1.2. Nonetheless, in an international environment that remains competitive and potentially hostile, even inherently pacifistic democratic states are compelled to maintain armies.[5] The existence of standing forces produces pressures within the military for war, since:

---

[1] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* Vol II, trans. Henry Reeve. (New York. Vintage Classics, 1990), 264
[2] Ibid., 254.
[3] Ibid , 256.
[4] Ibid , 257.
[5] Ibid , 264.

1.2.1. Rank in democratic armies is not determined by birth. Democratic armed forces mirror the society that produces them. This has powerful effects on how promotion occurs within the ranks:

1.2.1.1. Rank in an aristocratic army is largely pre-determined by pre-existing social structures, which tends to limit ambition in uniform.

1.2.1.2 Rank in democratic armies is earned irrespective of prior social status, which tends to both produce and reward ambition within the ranks.

1.2.2. Promotion opportunities in peacetime democratic armies are comparatively scarce, due to the virtually unlimited pool of potential competitors and the lack of vacancies in the senior ranks that would naturally occur during wartime due to casualties.[6]

1.2.3. The combination of ambition and restricted opportunities for advancement results in a military whose mid-level leadership sees war as an opportunity for advancement; "war makes vacancies and warrants the violation of that law of seniority which is the sole privilege natural to democracy."[7]

1.3. Danger to democratic society arises, paradoxically, during those pacifistic periods in which a state places the *least* value on its armed forces, and as

---

[6] Ibid , 266
[7] Ibid , 266.

argued above, democratic states tend toward pacifism. This danger is the result of broad social attitudes toward the members of the armed forces:

> 1.3.1. When there is little social value placed on military service, the armed forces will cease to be attractive to the best qualified members of society. This leads to a destructive cycle in which "the best part of the nation shuns the military profession because that profession is not honored, and the profession is not honored because the best part of the nation has ceased to follow it."[8]
>
> 1.3.2. As members of the armed forces generally have little property, they have the least to lose in the event of government overthrow or radical changes in the social order.
>
> 1.3.3. The combination of restless ambition, relative social inferiority, and the sense that little is to be lost in any event tends to accentuate the isolation of the military from its society.[9]

1.4. The combination of these three key points results in a set of observations common to democratic states: "There are two things that a democratic people will always find very difficult, to begin a war and to end it."[10]

2. Relations between elements within the armed forces

2.1. Democratic states will tend to rely on conscription rather than volunteers for raising armed forces, as there is neither significant social nor financial gain from military service.[11]

---

[8] Ibid , 267.
[9] Ibid , 267

2.1.1. Where conscription drives military service, terms of service for the majority of the armed forces tend to be comparatively short, and the attitudes of society as a whole tend to permeate the armed forces.

2.1.2. So long as conscription is applied fairly, without exception, the armed forces will tend to accept significant deprivation without complaint.

2.2. Those who see military service as a career will develop significantly different attitudes from those whose service is limited and who return relatively quickly to society.

2.2.1. Uniquely military professional attitudes will not arise in the vast majority of a conscript army, as their attachment is to the society to which they will soon return. This body of people is the most conservative in a democratic conscript army.

2.2.2. On the other hand, those who commit themselves to a military career renounce much of what they leave behind in civilian life.

2.3. The officer corps will tend to develop a set of values and attitudes that is at odds with the rest of society. This is a result of:

2.3.1. The relationship between earned rank and the fate of the army. In democratic states, the military officer has no equivalent civilian rank apart from military life.[12] This creates a powerful attachment to the institution.

2.3.2. The effects of war on the individual's career. This argument grows out of argument 1.3. above.

---

[10] Ibid , 268
[11] Ibid , 271.

2.4. The most senior officers will tend to become increasingly conservative, becoming a distinctive group from the junior and mid-grade officer corps and the non-commissioned officers, who share similarly aggressive attitudes toward war.

2.4.1. Acquisition of rank is similar to the acquisition of property, in that it creates an increasingly conservative attitude as the achievement or acquisition increases. The individual with the highest rank has the most to lose.

2.4.2. This tendency to protect existing gains begins to counterbalance the ambition of those who have advanced the farthest.

2.4.3. Senior commanders become the most conservative element in the armed forces: "...the least warlike and also the least revolutionary part of a democratic army will always be its chief commanders."[13]

2.4.4. The most dangerous group in the armed forces will be those who occupy the space between the large numbers of conscripts or short-term enlistees and the senior leadership. This group, unless given considerable career security, will tend to be least satisfied with the status quo, and will be the least pacifistic.

3. Relations between states and other states

3.1. The longer a state has been at peace, the greater the danger of losing a war. This results from several characteristics of democratic armies:

---

[12] Ibid., 273
[13] Ibid , 273

3.1.1. The longer the period of peace, the less likely the best talents of the state will have chosen the military as a profession. This argument is outlined in more detail above.

3.1.2. Promotion in democratic armies is based largely on seniority, a tendency that results in a highly conservative mind-set among the senior officers (see argument above), and in a high median age among the most senior leadership. This may be innocuous in peacetime, but at war the vigor of youth is desirable.[14]

3.1.2. The increasing conservatism of its senior leadership tends to spread throughout the ranks of a peacetime army. The most ambitious and talented people leave to seek their fortunes elsewhere, leaving behind a group of people whose generally view the armed forces as an extension of civilian life, and who have little interest in preparing for a war that would disrupt the comfortable routine of a peacetime army.[15]

3.1.3. As there is little public support for the armed forces in peacetime in democratic states (see argument above), the armed forces will be negatively affected by a lack of moral backing from society as a whole, and this in turn will impair their fighting ability.

3.2. Once at war, however, protracted warfare favors democratic states.

3.2.1. Democratic societies require a long time to focus their energies on anything other than the conduct of private business, but given adequate

---

[14] Ibid., 277
[15] Ibid , 277.

time, they attack this problem with the same energies they previously devoted to self-enrichment.

3.2.2. War damages the business affairs of a state, which are largely speculative. War itself takes on this speculative nature, which is amenable to the energies of democratic civil society. It gradually absorbs all the energies and ambitions of society and channels them into prosecution of the war.

3.2.3. As war continues to attract public attention, the armed forces begin to attract the state's best talent. The destruction of the seniority system has strongly beneficial effects, as war "...breaks through regulations and allows extraordinary men to rise above the common level."[16]

3.2.4. There exists a "...secret connection between the military character and the character of democracies, which war brings to light."[17] The character traits that bring success in democracies, tend when diverted from business to produce highly effective combat forces. This secret connection is:

3.2.4.1. In democratic societies, there is a tendency to place a high value on quick acquisition of profit with the least possible expenditure of energy.

---

[16] Ibid , 278
[17] Ibid., 278

3.2.4.2. Democratic societies encourage the taking of great risks in exchange for the possibility of great rewards, and this is particularly the case in combat, which promises instant recognition or greatness in exchange for a moment of great bravery.[18]

3.3. As a consequence of the role of time in the potential outcome of a war, democratic states have unique resources that, given adequate time, will give them a distinct advantage in a war with a non-democratic state.

4. Factors internal to the armed forces as a whole

4.1. Discipline in non-democratic societies results in centralization and obedience, a reflection of relations in society as a whole.

4.1.1. In non-democratic armies, discipline reflects the pre-existing social order. There is an essential continuity between society and the armed forces.

4.1.2. This condition of blind obedience has been conditioned by non-democratic society; it results in fighting forces that fight only on the basis of discipline rather than any attachment to society.

4.2. Social equality in society does not destroy the bonds of discipline between military ranks, but discipline takes on new forms.

4.2.1. Democratic states cannot and should not adopt the same methods of discipline used in other armies, as this would be foreign to their nature. What they would gain would be more than offset by what they lose.

---

[18] Ibid., 278.

4.2.2. Discipline in democratic armies should not attempt to destroy free will, but rather channel it.[19]

4.2.3. Obedience that has been directed to some purpose utilizing the free will of the soldier "...is less exact, but it is more eager and more intelligent."[20]

4.3. Discipline in democratic armies is automatically strengthened during wartime through the operation of intelligent free will.

4.3.1. Obedience rests on reason and is thus adjusted to conditions, often becoming more strict in the face of great danger than could otherwise have been ordered.

4.3.2. The simultaneous operation of free will and enlightened self-interest of the soldiers in democratic armies compels a spontaneous discipline that results in greater flexibility and a greater ability to function when conditions change rapidly or there is no direct order to compel appropriate action.[21]

5. Factors common to states and societies as a whole

5.1. As democratic states proliferate, wars between them will become more rare.

5.1.1. The inherently pacifistic nature of democracies makes them generally reluctant to pursue war as state policy.

---

[19] Ibid., 279
[20] Ibid , 279
[21] Ibid , 280.

5.1.2. As democracies proliferate, the people within the various states will tend to share interests. Furthermore, their commercial interests will tend to converge.

5.1.3. War's effects on any state will be felt by all under democratic conditions; this there exists a powerful disincentive to wage a war that would be equally destructive to all parties.

5.2. If democratic states *are* driven to wage war, there will be a tendency for them to involve other states.

5.2.1. Despite the disincentives to wage war noted above, the interlocking interests of democratic societies will tend to draw in all affected parties, thereby expanding the number of states involved.

5.2.2. The identification of the individual with other individuals in warring states will tend to draw in bystander states, despite their initial reluctance.

5.3. As states become more alike, their success in war will rely increasingly on the sizes of their armed forces.

5.3.1. As states become more alike, their armed forces will become more similar. There will be progressively smaller qualitative differences between forces.

5.3.2. When all soldiers are equally efficient, sheer numbers of soldiers will determine battlefield success.[22]

---

[22] Ibid , 283.

5.3.3. As numbers become the determinant of combat power in democratic states, armies will tend to grow in size despite the inherently pacifistic nature of the state.

5.5. When a democratic state is invaded, it will tend to lay down its arms more quickly than would be the case in a non-democratic state.

5.5.1. Individuals in democracies are not bound together by hierarchical social ties. When their territory is invaded and their army defeated, there is no nucleus of resistance (as opposed to an aristocracy, which offers numerous focal points for resistance).

5.5.2. Resistance will tend to be sporadic and largely ineffective if the government falls and the state is figuratively decapitated.

5.6. Civil wars will be less prevalent and of shorter duration in democratic states.[23]

5.6.1. The absence of martial spirit in democracies noted above tends to encourage a reluctance on the part of democracies to wage war; this is true of civil wars as well.

5.6.2. The centralized government apparatus has no competitor in democracies. Thus there is no institutional nucleus for a development of a rival to the existing government in a democracy.

---

[23] It is important to note Tocqueville's qualification of what constitutes a civil war He observes that in a conflict between two or more components of a confederate democracy, where significant power resides in the state governments, " civil wars are in fact nothing but foreign wars in disguise " Ibid., 286

5.6.3 Given this absence of centers of resistance, it will be far easier to take government at a single stroke than through a protracted war.

5.6.4. In the event of a split within the armed forces, however, the insurrection will tend to be bloody but quick, since the first party that seized the government apparatus would have an immediate and probably insurmountable advantage.